LATEST PROJECTS

 
Twice-told tales: Self-repetition decreases observer assessments of performer authenticity

People often engage in self-repetition—repeating the same story, joke, or presentation across different audiences. While behaving consistently has generally been found to enhance perceptions of authenticity, 10 studies demonstrate that performers who are revealed to be self-repeating are perceived as less authentic. We find convergent evidence that this effect is driven by observers’ implicit assumption that social interactions are unique. Self-repetitions violate this assumption, leading observers to judge performers as inauthentic because they are thought to be falsely presenting their performance as unique when it is not. We find that observer awareness of self-repetition decreases perceived authenticity even in situations in which it is normative to repeat a performance and in which repetition is required. The decrease in authenticity is eliminated only when performers overtly acknowledge self-repetition, as performers are no longer viewed as falsely presenting themselves.

Gershon, Rachel, and Rosanna K. Smith. "Twice-told tales: Self-repetition decreases observer assessments of performer authenticity." Journal of personality and social psychology (2019).

 
Goods Donations Increase Charitable Credit for Low-Warmth Donors

Low-warmth actors are often assumed to lack communal (or other-oriented) intentions, even when acting generously. Low-warmth donors must therefore send stronger signals of their communal intent when donating to receive the same amount of charitable credit as high-warmth donors. Because goods are linked with communal norms, we find that donating goods allows low-warmth donors to signal communal intent and increase charitable credit received. 

Gershon, Rachel, and Cynthia Cryder. "Goods donations increase charitable credit for low-warmth donors." Journal of Consumer Research 45, no. 2 (2017): 451-469.

Gershon, Rachel, and Cynthia Cryder. "Goods donations increase charitable credit for low-warmth donors." Journal of Consumer Research 45, no. 2 (2017): 451-469.

Gershon, Rachel, Cynthia Cryder, and Leslie John. "Why Prosocial Referral Incentives Work: The Interplay of Reputational Benefits and Action Costs​." SSRN, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3176019

Why Prosocial Referral Incentives Work: The Interplay of Reputational Benefits and Action Costs​

While selfish incentives typically outperform prosocial incentives, we show that in the context of customer referral rewards, prosocial incentives can be more effective. Companies frequently offer “selfish” (i.e., sender-benefiting) referral incentives, offering customers financial incentive for recruiting new customers. However, companies can alternatively offer “prosocial” (i.e., recipient-benefiting) referral incentives. In two field experiments and an incentive-compatible lab experiment, recipient-benefiting referrals, relative to sender-benefiting referrals, result in more new customers. In five subsequent experiments, we explain why this effect occurs.

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